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"Keeping Up With Technology": An Analysis of the Fourth Amendment Concerning the Search
and Seizure of Students' Cell Phones to Investigate Instances of Bullying
Thomas McGrady*
I. Introduction

In full, the Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 1
Under New Jersey v. T.L. 0., however, school administrators are not required to adhere to the
strict letter of the Fourth Amendment? In TL.O., the Supreme Court held that (1) school
officials are not required to obtain a warrant in order to search a student tmder their authority; (2)
school officials do not have to strictly adhere to the probable cause requirement in determining
whether the search is lawful;3 and (3) the legality of a search should depend on the
reasonableness of the search in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances.4 Instead of
requiring school administrators to strictly adhere to the Fourth Amendment's requirements, the
Supreme Court established a new standard for school officials' searches and seizures of
students. 5 The standard provides that a search in this context is reasonable if it is (1) justified at
its inception and (2) reasonable in its scope.6 The Supreme Court, with this standard, attempted
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to strike a balance between students' privacy interests in their personal property and schools'
responsibility to maintain order and discipline among the student body.

7

Although the T.L. 0. standard has provided adequate flexibility for school officials to
conduct searches and seizures of a student's bag or locker, the current test does not provide any
guidance regarding a school official's ability to search and seize a student's cell phone when
used on and off school grounds to bully another student. It is unclear, under TL. 0., whether
future courts reviewing this issue -vvill favor (1) a student's privacy expectation in the information
contained in modem cell phones, or (2) school officials' crucial responsibility of thoroughly
investigating and preventing instances of bullying.
With the advancements in teclmology-particularly the increasing capabilities of s1nart
phones-and the pervasive problem of bullying throughout our society, the culTent standard
needs to be altered in order to allow school officials more flexibility to meet these contemporary
obstacles. Bullying has become such a vexing concern that many state legislatures, including
New Jersey, have passed specific laws that are aimed at preventing bullying in schools. 8 For
example, New Jersey's anti-bullying statute "calls for tougher penalties to be doled out to
students discovered to be bullying, and also makes school administrators more accountable if
they do not investigate complaints. " 9
If these state anti-bullying statutes are going to hold school officials liable for not
conducting proper investigations, then the courts must provide these administrators greater
latitude in conducting searches and seizures in conjunction with bullying investigations. As this
Comment -vvill discuss later, bullying not only jeopardizes security on school grounds, but it also
has a disparaging impact on a student's ability to complete assignments and pay attention during
7

ld.
See, e.g., Monsy Alvarado, Halting Bullies is New Priority, THE RECORD, Sept. 6, 2011, at AI.
9 ld.
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class. 10 Since advancements in technology-namely smart phones-compound the bullying
problem, courts need to provide school administrators with more guidance on their authority to
search and seize a student's cell phone in order to investigate a bullying allegation.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the two-prong standard that the Cou11 established in
TL. 0., which attempts to balance a student's privacy interest against the school's interest in

maintaining order and discipline. 11 This section will also analyze how this standard has provided
sotne guidance regarding claims of unreasonable searches and seizures against school officials
concerning students' personal property.
Part III will provide a discussion of (1) the capabilities of smart phones; (2) the
increasing number of people-specifically students-who continue to purchase smart phones;
and (3) the privacy interests that individuals have in tpeir cell phones. An analysis of smart
phones' capabilities and prevalence is necessary to highlight the students' privacy interests at
issue. Part IV of this Com1nent will observe the pervasive bullying problem and discuss how
this issue has becotne increasingly prevalent to the point that state legislatures are specifically
tailoring laws to regulate the dangerous effects of bullying. An analysis of bullying and the state
anti-bullying statutes-particularly New Jersey's statute-is necessary to highlight the schools'
custodial interests.
Pat1 V will analyze public-school officials' authority, under the current standard, to
search cell phones used to bully students during school hours. Part VI will observe public
school administrators' authority, under the current standard, to regulate cell phone use offcan1pus. This section will also discuss the reasons why the Supreme Court needs to alter TL. 0.

10
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standard in order to adequately account for the continuing advancement of smart phones in
conjunction with the pervasive issue of bullying in schools.
II. The Current Standard

A. New Jersey v. TL. 0.
Courts currently apply the TL. 0. standard to determine whether a school-conducted
search of a student's personal property is constitutional. 12 In TL.O., an investigation ensued
when a high school teacher discovered a freshman student smoking in the school lavatory and
brought her down to the principal's office. 13 For this school, s1noking cigarettes on school
grounds was a violation of school rules. 14 When the student was asked to explain the incident,
she denied that she was smoking in the batlu·o01n. 15 After this, the assistant principal demanded
to see her purse, in order to uncover evidence of the violation. 16 While searching the purse, the
school official found cigarettes, cigarette rolling papers, a small quantity of marijuana, a pipe,
and other evidence indicating that this student vvas involved in the consumption and transaction
of marijuana. 17 In the State's delinquency case brought pursuant to this incident, the student
claimed that the search of her purse was unreasonable, and thus violated her Fourth Amendment
rights. 18
The New Jersey Supre1ne Court held that the search was unreasonable. 19 The Supre1ne
Court of the United States reversed. The Court found
(1) that the Fourth Atnendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials; (2) that school
officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
12
13
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authority; (3) that school officials need not strictly adhere to the requirement that
searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has
violated or is violating the law, and that the legality of their search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search, and (4) that the search in this case was not unreasonable under the Fourth
A1nendment. 20
The Court established a twofold inquiry to determine the reasonableness of a school
official's search of a student's property? 1 Such a search must be (1) justified at its inception;
and (2) reasonable in scope. 22 The Court established this standard to strike an appropriate
balance between ''the schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally
legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place .... " 23 The Cm.rrt
recognized that in the school setting, certain modifications to the Fourth Amendment's
requirements for "reasonable" searches and seizures are appropriate. 24 Some of these alterations
include warrantless searches and the relaxation of the "probable cause" requirement. 25 The
Court also noted that the responsibility of school administrators to maintain order among the
student body "requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures" as well as
the preservation of the "informality of the student-teacher relationship."26
The Court explained that, in order for a search in this context to be justified at its
inception, there must be ''reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating . . . the rules of the school. " 27
"sufficient probability, not certainty."28

This requires

The Court held that the search was justified at its

ld.
Jd. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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I d. at 341.
28
Jd. at 346 (quoting Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797,804 (1981)).
20
21

5

inception because a teacher discovered a clear violation of the student code and the search was
conducted because of the specific information provided by school staff. 29
Further, the Court posited that a search is reasonable in scope when Hthe 1neasures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intn1sive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."30 The actual search
should only be as intrusive as necessary vvith regards to the degree of suspicion. 31

The Court

found that the search was reasonable in its scope because during the course of a lavvful search for
cigarettes, the school administrator(s) discovered reasonable suspicion of other school
violations. 32
The crux of this case is the effort that the Supreme Court made to strike a balance
between students' privacy interests in their personal property and schools' responsibility to
maintain discipline among the student body. As this Comment will analyze below, this standard,
which has proven satisfactory in providing school officials with appropriate guidance for some
time, is no longer adequate in light of society's technological advancements.
B. TL. 0. Application
After the TL. 0. Court established the standard for determining the reasonableness of
school-conducted searches of student property, courts around the country began applying this
test. 33 In Com1nonwealth v. Snyder, a student challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained
fro1n the warrantless search of his locker. 34 The search produced illegal substances, and the
school reported its findings to the police; the student was subsequently arrested. 35 The plaintiff

29

I d. at 346.
T.L. 0., 469 U.S. at 342.
31 ld.
32
Id. at 347.
33
See, e.g., Sims v. Bracken Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 10-33-DLB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110822 (E.D.Ky. 2010).
34
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Mass. 1992).
35
ld. at 1365.
30
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claimed that the search of his locker, which was conducted by a school official, violated the
Fouiih Amendment. 36 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, citing T.L. 0., stated that
the Fourth Atnendment requirements need not be strictly adhered to in the school setting.

37

Further in line with this reasoning, the court held that a warrantless search of the student's locker
without notice was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the search was reasonable
at its inception and in its scope. 38
In In re: Patrick Y, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the search of the student's
locker was reasonable and thus not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 39 After receiving
infonnation that there were drugs and/or weapons on school grounds, the school principal
authorized the search of all student lockers. 40 The principal searched the plaintiffs locker and
found a bag that contained a switch blade and a pager. 41 Both of these items were not permitted
on school premises. 42 The plaintiff claimed that the school violated the Fourth Amendment
because the search of his locker was based on a "vague and unsubstantiated rumor." 43

In

particular, the student contended that ( 1) the school lacked reasonable suspicion to search his
locker; and that (2) by searching his bag, the search was unreasonable in scope. 44 This court
noted, in accordance with TL. 0., that in the school setting, the standards for reasonable searches
and seizures under the Foutih Amendment are relaxed. 45

Although the Court of Appeals

acknowledged the T.L. 0. standard in its opinion, it did not tmdertake the T.L. 0. analysis because

Id.
Id. at 1366-67.
38
Id. at 1368.
39
In re: Patrick Y, 746 A.2d 405,414 (Md. 2000).
40
I d. at 407.
41 kl
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45
In re: Patrick Y, 746 A.2d at 410.
36
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of its preliminary finding that students do not have a legitimate privacy interest in an assigned
locker. 46
In Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, the plaintiffs alleged that the search of their
son's cell phone by a school official vvas "unreasonable" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 47 The cell phone was initially searched because displaying a cell phone during
school hours was a violation of the school's policy. 48 The administrators used the student's cell
phone to investigate and possibly find further violations of school rules. 49 The school official
found a text message that the student received from his girlfriend asking him to bring her a
"f***in' tampon." 50 The school argued to the court that "tampon" is slang for a marijuana
cigarette. 5 1 This prompted further investigation of the cell phone. 52
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that
TL. 0. was the governing standard for school-conducted searches of student property, but stated

that even though the standard is not as strict as the traditional Fotuih Amendment standard, the
search must nonetheless be reasonable with regard to the circutnstances. 53 The co1.u1 found that
the first prong of the TL. 0. standard-that the search must be justified at its inception-was
satisfied because the student was violating the school's policy against displaying or using a cell
phone on school grounds. 54 With respect to the second prong of the test-that the search must be
reasonable in scope-the court found that the search vvas unreasonably broad given the totality of

46

ld at 414.
Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (E.D.Pa. 2006),
48
ld at 630.
49
ld at 628.
50
ld at 631.

47

51ld
52ld
53
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Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
ld at 640.
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the circumstances. 55 The court reasoned that the justification for seizing the phone was not
sufficient to allow the school to search through the student's text messages, voice mails, and call
logs, and that it was unreasonable to use the cell phone to anony1nously contact other students. 56
In Veronia School District 47J v. Wayne Action, the Supreme Court upheld the school
district's drug policy of rand01nly drug testing student-athletes, finding that the policy satisfied
both prongs of the TL. 0. test. 57 In this case, the school district mandated that the studentathletes participate in a drug testing program vvith parental consent. 58 A student and his parents
refused to sign the consent forms and filed a suit against the school district for violations of the
Fourth Amendment. 59 The Court upheld the school district's dn1g policy because it found that
not all searches required "individualized suspicion" in order to be constitutional. 60 The Court
noted that certain circumstances, namely a pervasive drug proble1n in the school, may allow
school officials to conduct broader searches. 61 Scalia, in his majority opinion, also posited that
student-athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy due to their voluntary involve1nent in
spo1is. 62 The Court narrowed its holding by positing that as long as the drug policy was aimed
only at the investigation of drug violations by its student-athletes, the search was constitutional
under the TL. 0. standard. 63
In 2009, the Supreme Court applied the TL. 0.

standard to determine the

"reasonableness" of a strip search conducted by a school official on a student. 64 The school's
student code strictly prohibited "the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school
55

ld. at 641.
ld.
Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Wayne Action, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995).
58
ld. at 650.
59
ld. at 651.
60
!d. at 664.
61
!d. at 663.
62
!d. at 657.
63
Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 663.
64
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2634 (2009).
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grounds. " 65 A student informed school officials that the plaintiffs daughter was in possession of
prohibited drugs. 66 The school contended that this provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to
justify the search of the student's belongings. 67

In conjunction with this investigation, the

student was brought to the school nurse and was forced to remove her bra and expose part of her
pelvic region. 68
The Com1 used the T.L. 0. standard and held that the strip search of the student violated
the Fourth Amendment. 69

Although the Court found that the search was Hjustified at its

inception" because the school had information that the student was violating a school policy
against the possession of drugs, it ultilnately found that search violated the Fourth Amendment
because it failed the second prong of the TL. 0. standard. 70 The Court found that the strip search
was uru·easonable in its scope because the degree of intrusion was not warranted by the degree of
suspicion. 71
C. Conclusion
The TL. 0. standard is still adequate in providing guidance as to the constitutionality of a
search and seizure of a student's bag or locker by a school official vvith regards to investigation
of drugs or weapons violations, but it is inadequate in determining a school acln1inistrator's
authority to search and seize a student's cell phone in connection with a bullying investigation.
It is clear that schools will have an easier time passing constitutional muster vvhen searching and

seizing a student's personal property to investigate suspected school-rule violations because
these issues are clearly established. It is less clear, however, how this standard applies in cases

65

I d. at 2634.
I d. at 2640.
67
I d. at 2641.
68
!d. at 2638.
69
I d. at 2641.
70
Stafford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 129 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
71 !d.
66
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involving a search and seizure of a student's cell phone to investigate allegations or complaints
of bullying. The complications of this situation are compounded when a school official searches
and seizes a student's smart-phone to further its survey of a bullying infraction. There are
several issues involved in this inquiry: (1) Does a student have a privacy right in his or her
personal cell phone?; (2) Has the proble111 of bullying reached a level ·where the law will allow
school administrators greater latitude to investigate students' cell phones?; (3) What is the reach
of school ad1ninistrators' authority when a cell phone is used on school grounds to bully another
student?; (4) What is their authority to investigate a student's cell phone that is used off-campus
to bully a student?
III. Problems Presented by the Advancements of the "Cell Phone"
A. Capabilities of the Cell Phone
With the evolution of the cell phone into the "smart phone," our handheld telephones
now have the capacity to function as mini-computers. 72 These smart-phones have the ability to
store massive amounts of personal information, including text 1nessages, voice mails, and emails,
as well as all information contained in the user's web browser. 73 As cell phones continue to
advance, several legal issues are implicated, including the degree of privacy interests that an
individual may have in his or her personal cellular device.
Charles Arthur, writer for The Guardian, posited that smart phones are actually 1nore
technologically advanced than our PCs, and that these devices are out-selling PCs. 74 Further,
Tomi Ahonen, a former Nokia executive, contended that

72

~~[s]martphones

Charles Arthur, How the Smartphone is Killing the PC, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2011,
http://www .guardian. co. uk/technology/20 11 /jun/05/smartphones-kill ing-pc.
73 ld.
74/d.

11

will keep growing in

sales approaching the billion-plus levels of total handset sales before this decade is done .... "

75

Because cell phones are becoming very advanced and heavily consu1ned to the point that a large
majority of Americans are essentially carrying a personal computer in their pockets, the law
needs to be reconsidered in several areas, especially within the realm of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Privacy Interests and Rights in Cell Phones
As cell phones continue to advance, courts are deciding cases in which law enforcement
officials, without a warrant, search a person's cellular device in conjunction with their
investigation. 76 Since there is a lack of case law regarding a student's privacy interests in his or
her cell phone, this Comment will undertake a general analysis of such privacy rights and
attempt to impose these principles of law into the school setting.
One approach that cou1is have used in analyzing warrantless cell phone searches is to
analogize the cell phone to a closed container. 77 In United States v. Finley, the defendant was
arrested during a traffic stop based on law enforcement's assertion that the passenger sold
methamphetamine to an informant. 78 During the search of the vehicle, the police discovered a
cell phone in Finley's pocket. 79

While the two suspects were being questioned, a law

enforcement officer searched through the cell phone and found evidence of the drug
transaction. 80 Although a law enforce1nent officer would typically need a -vvanant to search an
individual's "closed container," this search was conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest, and thus
the warrantless search of the ''closed container" (cell phone) was reasonable under the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 81 Since the investigation did not require

75

I d. at A2.

76

See, e.g., U.S. v. Young, 278 Fed. App'x. 242 (4th Cir. 2008).
U.S. v. Finley, 447 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
78
I d. at 253.
79 !d.
80 ld.
81
/d. at 260.
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a warrant in these circu1nstances, equating the defendant's cell phone to a closed container 1nade
the search of this property constitutional. 82
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Young, imposed a slightly different approach than
the ''closed container" classification of the cell phone used in Finley. 83 In Young, the defendant
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through a police officer's investigation of his text
messages on the grounds that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amend1nent. 84 During
this warrantless search, officers seized a bag of heroin along with the text messages as evidence
against the defendant. 85 The Fourth Circuit, citing Finley, held that the search and seizure of the
text 1nessages were permissible because the officer's need to obtain evidence from the cell phone
outweighed the defendant's privacy interest in the cell phone. 86 This case presents another
example of how some federal circuits are more protective of law enforcement officers'
responsibility to preserve evidence than of an individual's right to privacy with regard to
personal information contained in his or her cell phone. 87
Another approach, which provides more protection to individuals' privacy interests in
their personal cell phones against searches and seizures, was conveyed by the Supreme Court of
Ohio in State v. Smith. 88 In this case, the defendant argued that the cou1i should suppress the
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his personal cell phone because the search was
unlawful. 89

The Supreme Court of Ohio noted three approaches that courts have used in

recognizing an individual's privacy right in his or her cell phone, and decided to impose a

ld.
Compare U.S. v. Young, 278 Fed. App'x. 242 (4th Cir. 2008) with U.S. v. Finley, 447 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
84
Jd at 244.
85 !d.
86
I d. at 245-46.
87
See id.
88
State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
89
Jd. at 951.
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''legitimate expectation of privacy" test. 90 The Court reasoned that ''[g]iven the continuing rapid
advancements in cell phone technology, we acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns
regarding the effect of allowing warrantless searches of cell phones, especially so-called smart
phones, which allow for high-speed Internet access and are capable of storing tremendous
amounts of private data." 91

Although the Smith court rejected the closed-container approach

used in Finley and Young, it was not willing to provide cell phones with the high privacy rights
given to laptop computers. 92 This court held that,
because a cell phone is not a closed container, and because an individual has a
privacy interest in the contents of a cell phone that goes beyond the privacy
interest in an address book or pager, an officer may not conduct a search of a cell
phone's contents incident to a lawful arrest without first obtaining a vvarrant. 93
The third and most protective approach of an individual's privacy right against the search
and seizure of a personal cell phone was conveyed in United States v. Park. 94 In this case, law
enforcement officers, pursuant to a warrant, searched the building that Park had just exited. 95
Through the search, officers discovered drug-paraphernalia that is nonnally used for cultivating
marijuana. 96 The officers anested Park pursuant to this evidence and seized his cell phone. 97
Before the arresting officer returned the cell phone to the booking officers, he recorded names
and numbers from Park's cell phone. 98 The United States District Court for the Northern J?istrict
of California recognized that contemporary cellular devices ''have the capacity for storing
immense amounts of private information," 99 and thus likened the devices to laptop c01nputers-

90

91
92
93
94

95

Id. at 954.
!d.
!d. at 955.
Jd.
U.S. v. Park, No. 05-375, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
at *4.

Jd.
96 !d.
97
!d.
98
Id.
99
Jd.

at *5.
at *8.
at *21
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in which arrestees have significant privacy interests-rather than to address books or pagers, in
which arrestees have lesser privacy interests. 100 Because the search in this case did not satisfy
the narrow exceptions that allow officers to search a cell phone's information without a warrant,
which include concern for the officer's safety, the court found that the search was unreasonable
and suppressed the evidence obtained from the cell phone. 101
Because of the continued technological advancements of cell phones and smart phones, it
appears that the Park approach should become the standard for analyzing an individual's privacy
rights in his or her cell phone against searches and seizures.

This is the most reasonable

approach because, as noted earlier, the capability of 1nodem-day cell phones is practically that of
a laptop computer.

Laptop computers are capable of storing large quantities of personal

infonnation and are thus given a high degree of privacy protection; cell phones should be treated
the same, especially as the technology and consu1nption of smart phones continues to progress.
· The issue that remains umesolved by the courts is how to analyze a student's privacy
rights in his or her personal cell phone with regard to a school-conducted search and seizure of
its contents. The Supreme Cotn1 in T.L. 0. provided that the standards of the Fourth Amendment
are more relaxed in the school setting. 102 Yet, now that the cell phone technology continues to
advance, the courts will have to decide ·whether to give more protection to the private
information contained in these smart phones, or to continue the trend of providing school
officials with flexibility in searching and seizing student property in conjunction with its
investigations of school policy infractions.

The cou1is must acknowledge that modern cell

phones, especially smart phones, are capable of storing a variety of personal inforn1ation which
implicates a sensitive privacy issue when they are subject to search and seizure. In the interest of
100

Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 at *21-22.

101

Id at *25.

102

See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
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protecting students and faculty n1embers, however, courts and lawmakers should weigh in favor
of granting school administrators the appropriate latitude to maintain order and security even at
the expense of infringing on student's privacy rights.
Because of the technological advancements of cell phones, ho·wever, courts will have to
recognize the sensitive privacy issues implicated by searching and seizing the information
contained in these devices. The vast capabilities of smart phones present two competing issues.
First, since smati phones are able to store vast amounts of personal information like computers,
courts may consider granting students more privacy rights against searches and seizures of their
personal cell phones by school officials. Students would have a stronger argument that moden1
cell phones should carry a higher degree of privacy protection because of their advanced
capabilities. On the other hand, students' use of smati phones both on and off school grounds
can i1npede the school officials' crucial responsibility to prevent instances of bullying, and, as
such, courts may consider granting school officials greater latitude in conducting such searches,
regardless of the privacy interests at stake.

School officials are in dire need-especially as

bullying is becoming more prevalent-of the courts' assistance in the fight against student
violence and deaths for which bullying is responsible. Although protection of individual privacy
is an i1nportant issue, the courts should weigh in favor of providing schools greater authority in
regulating and investigating bullying.
IV. The Pervasive Problem of Bullying
Although bullying has always been a part of our society, this issue has reached a point
where it poses a true threat to the safety and progress of students across the country. In the wake
of tragedies such as the Cohunbine shooting 103 a11d Rutgers University's Tyler Clementi's

103

See infra note 124.
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death 104 , both of which were linked to the effects of bullying, forty-seven state legislatures have
enacted anti-bullying laws to help prevent future devastations. 105 Bullying has a negative impact
on both the safety of students and faculty in school, and on the academic experience that students
have a right to enjoy.
The 1nain difficulty that school administrators have with cyber-bullying is their inability
to detect the hannful behavior. 106 Cyber-bullying allows '~[s]tudents [to] gang up against one
another without leaving their bedrooms." 107 Consequences of cyber-bullying are 1nore pervasive
than instances of physical bullying because once a derogatory term or group is posted on the
Internet, it is there for everyone to notice. 108 The Internet creates a dangerous platform for
bullying, and having a smart phone accessible at all times allows bullies to continually harass
their victims.
This section will observe (1) state initiatives undertaken in order to control bullying, (2)
the negative impact that bullying has on the school administration's ability to 1naintain order and
discipline among the student body, and (3) the negative impact that bullying has on studentvictbns' ability to focus in school and perform acadetnically.
A. State Initiatives to Combat Bullying in Schools
Forty-eight states to date have enacted some type of anti-bullying statute in order to
provide school administrations with an appropriate guide on how to detect, report, and

104

See infra note 121.
Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey's Antibullying Lavv Should Be a N!odel for Other States, TIME U.S., Sept. 6, 20 II,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8559,2091994,00.html.
106
Sarah Palmero, Invisible Taunts, THE KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 20 I 0, available at
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=l&trnpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=
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investigate instances of harass1nent, intimidation, and bullying. 109

New Jersey, which is

recognized as having one of the strictest anti-bullying provisions in the country, recently
amended its 2002 anti-bullying statute to include an ~~Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights." 110 The focal
point of this

~~Bill

of Rights" is to provide school officials with the appropriate training and

timelines they need to effectively handle incidents of student bullying. 1II

One of these

guidelines reads:
Once an incident is reported, principal must inform parents of students involved,
and an investigation on the incident 1nust be initiated within one school day of the
report. A written report of the incident n1ust be completed after two clays, and an
investigation must be complete after 10 clays of the written report. Results of
investigation must be given to the superintendent within two days of completing
the inquiry. Superintendent may then decide to take action, and dole out
discipline. Schools superintendent must infonn the board of education about the
·investigation at its next meeting, then must give information to parents of students
within five days of sharing information with the board. Parents can request
confidential hearings before the board, which must be scheduled ·within 10
days.II2
The New Jersey provisions exceed the normal requirements of most anti-bullying statutes
in the United States.I 13 New Jersey's law provides that ~~schools 1nust conduct extensive training
of staff and students; appoint safety teams made up of parents, teachers, and staff; and launch an
investigation of every allegation of bullying ·within one day." 1I4 As evidenced by the abundant
efforts that New Jersey and other states have made to improve their anti-bullying laws, bullying
is a vexing proble1n in our society, and one that communities and governments across the
cotmtry consider a top priority.
109
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B. Bullying Threatens Security in Schools
There are tlu·ee main consequences of bullying that threaten the safety of students and
faculty across the cotmtry. The first two result from pervasive or chronic bullying, which may
lead the victi1n to either kill him or herself, class1nates and/or teachers, or both. First, students
who are victims of bullying can become so overwhelmed by abuse and humiliation to the point
that the victim decides to take his or her own life. 115 For exmnple, Ryan Patrick Halligan
decided to take his own life as a result of pervasive bullying by his peers. 116 The bully in this
situation victimized Ryan over the Internet; he took a conversation that the two boys had out of
context and turned it into a rumor that Ryan was gay. 117 This message permeated throughout the
entire student body. 118 Further, one of the more popular girls at the school persuaded Ryan into
believing that she was interested in hiin. 119 She later shared all of her online conversations with
Ryan to other students for the purpose of humiliating him. 120 Ryan, in response, stated that ''it
was girls like her that made him want to kill himself." 121 That is exactly what transpired as a
result of aggressive cyber-bullying by Ryan's peers. 122
Another tragedy connected with bullying occurred In 201 0 involving a freshman at
Rutgers University. Tyler Cle1nenti was eighteen years old when he committed suicide because
his ro01nmate posted live images of Clementi having sexual relations with another 1nan on the
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Internet.

123

The roommate set up a webcan1 in order to document Clementi having a sexual

encounter with another man and to post the findings on the Internet. 124 As a result of cyberbullying, Cle1nenti decided to take his own life rather than endure the humiliation of having his
private life exposed over the Internet for everyone to view. 125
Second, a victim of bullying can become overwhelmed by the pervasive harassment to
the point that the victim is thrown into uncontrollable rage, potentially causing the victim to
respond with deadly force against the bully and even other me1nbers of the school. "Bullying
instigated over 40 school shootings that took place during the past decade." 126 The gunman of
the Virginia Tech shootings, who was only twenty-three years old, stated before killing thirtythree people, including himself, "You thought it was one pathetic boy's life you were
extinguishing. Thanks to you, I die like Jesus Clu'ist to inspire generations of the weak and the
defenseless people." 127 Cho Seung-Hui, the gun1nan, was bullied for such a long period of time
that it resulted in the student's decision to go on a shooting spree. 128
The shooters in the Coltunbine killings cited a similar explanation as to why they
committed such a heinous act of violence. 129 Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold claimed that they
were ridiculed by their fellow class1nates incessantly to the point that they decided to take
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1natters into their own hands. 130 It was clear that these shooters had a lot of built up anger due to
an extended period of bullying and harass1nent. 131
The third consequence of bullying occurs when the actual victim is physically assaulted
as a result of the bullying. This type of violence usually occurs in the traditional sense where an
older and/or stronger bully uses his or her physical attributes to inti1nidate and harass a younger
and/or weaker victim. An example of this consequence occurred when a high-school fe1nale
student was physically assaulted by a group of girls over a MySpace argument. 132 When the
victim entered her friend's house, six girls were vvaiting to verbally and physically assault her. 133
The entire attack was videotaped and was posted on the Internet. 134

This consequence of

bullying is the least alanning of the three, but as seen in the situation above, it is still a concern
that school administrators must confront.
C. Bullying Negatively Impacts Students' Acaden1ic Performance
Since cyber-bullying victims become overwhehned with depression, anger, and
frustration, these e1notions, in 1nost cases, result in victims' inability to focus and perfonn
academically. 135 "Stories shared by cyberbullying victims attest to the fact that cyberbullying
can decrease students' grades and performance in school." 136 Maria Eisenberg and Dianne
Neurmark, in their article Peer 1-Iarassment, School Connectedness and Academic Achievement,
noted "that students who are bullied are more likely to Iniss school which in turn adds to being
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disconnected and missing educational opportunities." 137 In an article to the UCLA Newsroom,
Stuart Wolpert discussed a study conducted of 2,3 00 students in eleven public schools in the Los
Angeles area. 138 The research revealed that a higher level of bullying was directly connected to a
decrease in grade point average. 139 The study also produced findings that
[t]he students who were rated the 1nost-bullied performed substantially worse
academically than their peers. Projecting the findings on grade-point average
across all three years of middle school, a one-point increase on the four-point
bullying scale was associated with a 1.5foint decrease in GPA for one academic
subject (e.g., math)-a very large drop. 14

It is clear from the various studies highlighted above that bullying creates a true threat to
a student's security in the classromn and his or her ability to perform acade1nically.

Since

bullying has become such a prevalent issue in our society today, schools are becoming active to
prevent its dire consequences. Nonetheless, it re1nains that school officials have a li1nited ability
to regulate student bullying without violating their students' constitutional rights.
V. Public School Officials' Authority to Search Student Cell Phones Used On School Pre1nises
to Bully
As discussed above, TL. 0. and subsequent cases convey that Fourth Amendment
standards are relaxed when a search and seizure is conducted in the school setting. 141 Through
an analysis of several cases with respect to school-conducted searches of on-campus violations,
this section will determine that public school officials' have the authority to lawfully search a
student's cell phone that is used to bully another student during school hours.
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Although there is sparse case law that deals specifically with the legality of a search and
seizure of a student's personal cell phone, there are several relevant cases that provide guidance.
In Klump,

142

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed

an important issue that school officials will always have to face ·when searching a student's cell
phone. 143 An administrator must determine hovv much of a student's personal information he or
she can lawfully search. 144 This case is important to this discussion because it indicates that
there is a threshold as to how 1nuch information contained in a cell phone a school official can
search. 145 As noted earlier, cell phones, especially smart phones, trigger a sensitive privacy issue
because of their capacity to store vast amounts of personal information.

146

Another example of school-conducted searches of student property to investigate schoolpolicy violations on-cmnpus is seen in Binder v. Cold Spring Harbor Central School Distrisct. 147
Pursuant to a suggestion by a teacher and the scent of 1narijuana penn eating from the student, an
assistant principal and security guard searched the student's pockets and personal book-bag.

148

Through his search of the student's book-bag, the school official found a large plastic bag with
several small plastic baggies that contained marijuana. 149 Possessing cigarettes, drugs, or drug
paraphen1alia on school grounds violated school policy. 150 The cou1i found that the search
conducted by the assistant principal and security vvas reasonable, and thus constitutional.
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Binder demonstrates another application of the T. L. 0. standard with regards to a school
official searching a student's personal prope1iy.

In Binder, the property at issue was the

student's book-bag. 152 Although this is not a cell phone and does not implicate the same degree
of individual privacy interests, it is analogous, as book-bags can also be considered highly
personal.

Yet, the Binder co1.ni found that because the student presented a high degree of

suspicion that he was violating several school policies, it was reasonable for the school official to
conduct a search through the student's personal property. 153 As noted earlier in this Com1nent,
implication of a cell phone ·would most likely have made the Binder court's conclusion that the
search was reasonable much 1nore difficult. A cell phone has the capacity to store a greater
amount of personal information than a bag, and the courts would recognize this fact. Also, the
fact that the student was violating the student code of conduct vvhile in school could arguably
persuade the courts to allow school officials, as seen in Binder, n1ore latitude in conducting
searches and seizures of student property.
In Sims v. Bracken County School District, the Eastern District of Kentucky held that the
search of a student's jacket pursuant to a narcotics-trained canine's alert vvas reasonable under
the T.L. 0. standard. 154 In Dece1nber 2007, Bracken County High School officials announced
that H [they] vvould periodically patrol school grounds for contraband through the use of KSP' s
narcotics-trained canines." 155 During a routine search of a classroom, these narcotics-trained
''canines returned a positive alert on a student's jacket." 156 A search of the jacket revealed no
drugs-only ''a lighter, allergy eye drop, and $47.00." 157 Yet, the school officials asse1ied that
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the jacket did smell of marijuana. 158 The plaintiffs contended that the search and seizure of the
student's jacket was unconstitutional because it \Vas unreasonable in violation of the Fourth
Amendn1ent.

159

The court reasoned that the search of the jacket was constitutional because (1)

the K.SP dog's positive alert on the plaintiffs jacket made the search of this property reasonable
at its inception, 160 and (2) the scope of the search was reasonably tailored to the degree of
suspicion that the plaintiffposed. 161
Although this case does not demonstrate a school official's authority to search a student's
cell phone in conjunction vvith its investigation, Sims provides another exmnple of a schoolconducted search of a student's personal property. the Sims court found it pennissible for a
school official to search through a student's jacket because of the reasonable suspicion that it
contained n1arijuana. 162 Yet, a jacket most likely does not implicate the same privacy issue as a
phone. A jacket can only contain a limited mnount of personal information before it reaches its
capacity. The cell phone, however, has the vast capability of storing large amounts of personal
information including text messages, voice 1nails, emails, etc.
Even though all of these cases do not i1nplicate the search of a student's cell phone, they
do provide some insight on how the courts would most likely resolve such a situation. As the
Park court explained, the cell phone, especially the s1nart phone, implicates a sensitive privacy
interest similar to the personal computer. 163

Because s1nart phones are evolving into mini-

c01nputers, it is becoming 1nore difficult for school officials to justify such searches in order to
maintain security and academic progress.
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Yet, the Supreme Cotni has remained consistent in the prindple that school officials are
allotted some flexibility when it comes to conducting investigations of students violating school
policies and laws. 164 Students are not granted the same privacy interests as individuals walking
on the streets. 165 The reason for this is that school administrations have the crucial responsibility
of ensuring a safe learning environtnent for students under its contro1. 166
As previously discussed, the advanced technology of cell phones implicates a sensitive
privacy issue for students, while the pervasive problem of bullying triggers an in1portant
government interest in ensuring student safety. These c01npeting interests present the courts with
a potential dilemma in choosing whose interests should prevail: the students' or the
govermnent' s.
Pursuant to the national initiative to prevent the horrific tragedies associated with
bullying and the school's cn1cial responsibility of maintaining order and discipline mnong the
student body, the courts must reconsider the TL. 0. standard to provide school officials' more
authority in searching and seizing a student's smart phone to investigate instances of bullying oncampus. As noted earlier, bullying has been the catalyst of numerous assaults and killings across
the country. 167 It is up to the courts to continue what the state legislatures have started, and
establish a standard that allows schools the appropriate guidance and authority to prevent
catastrophes such as the Columbine shootings and the death of Tyler Clementi. This revised
TL. 0. standard should not only provide school officials with the authority to search and seize

students' cell phones when used on-campus to bully, but should also, as discussed in the section
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below, provide officials with authority to search and seize cell phones when the phone is used
off-campus to bully.

VI. Public School Officials' Authority to Search Student Cell Phones Used Off-Campus to Bully
A. The Tinker Standard
Since school officials are attempting to investigate off-campus conduct, the initial
question is whether public schools can discipline student conduct that transpires out of school.
The cases are not completely consistent, but the Supreme Court created a basic framework to
determine school officials' authority to regulate student expression that takes place offcampus. 168 The court established that if the student's conduct "substantially interfere[s] with the
work of the school or impinge[ s] upon the rights of other students" then school officials can
assert their authority. 169 This standard was first established in the landmark Supreme Cou1i case
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. In this case, school officials
suspended students from school because they decided to wore black arn1bands as a fonn of
protest against the Vietnam War. 170 The petitioners filed suit against the school for violating
their First Amendment right of free speech. 171 The Court found that the school officials had in
fact violated the students' freedom of expression under the First A1nendment. 172 The Court
reasoned that the students do not ''shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 173 In order to detennine whether the school's decision was
pem1issible, the Court reasoned that the act of ·wearing the arn1bands had to result in a
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''substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."

174

Since the Court

reasoned that no substantial disruption had occurred, the school had violated the petitioners First
Amendment freedom of expression. 175 Although this case was not a dispute about disciplining
student conduct off-campus, the Tinker standard was later used as the test for determining the
constitutionality of school officials' discipline of student conduct that occurs outside of
school. 176
B. The Tinker Standard Applied to Schools Regulating Off-Campus Conduct
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court considered the Tinker standard in order to determine a
school's ability to discipline student conduct that transpired off school grounds.

177

Here,

students during a school sanctioned off-campus event held up a sign in an auditorimn that stated:
''Bong Hits 4 Jesus." 178 The principal asked the students to take down the banner, but the
students refused to do so. 179 These students were subsequently suspended from school.

180

The

students filed suit against the school for violating their First Amendment rights. 181 Using the

Tinker standard, the Cou11 found that the suspension of these students did not violate the First
Amendment. 182 Using the ''substantial disruption" analysis, the Court held that it was reaso!lable
for the principal to request removal of the bann.er to be taken dovvn because it clearly promoted
the use of illegal dn1gs. 183 This sign, as the Court posited, could potentially cause a "substantial
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disruption" among the student body, and thus the school was justified in disciplining these
students for their off-campus conduct. 184
School officials are responsible for ensuring a safe learning environment for all students,
and discouraging the promotion of drugs is \Vell within their jurisdiction. Morse is an example
of how coutis handle student conduct when the schools' decision to punish collides with a
student's potential constitutional rights. This case does not specifically deal with conduct that
occurred off-campus because the conduct occurred at an off-campus school sanctioned event, but
Morse demonstrates how the Tinker standard provides school officials more flexibility in their

ability to regulate offensive conduct that would otherwise be a violation of students'
constitutional rights.
In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit used the Tinker standard to
help resolve the constitutionality of a school district's decision to punish a student's conduct offcampus. 185 Here, the student was disciplined for creating an internet profile of her principal that
contained inappropriate content. 186 This student only provided access to the profile to herself
and her friends. 187 J.S. was suspended for creating this profile that depicted the school principal
using inappropriate language and conduct." 188 The parents of J.S. sued the school district for
violating their daughter's First Amendment rights. 189
The Third Circuit, as an initial matter, found that the Tinker standard applied. 190 Yet, the
court noted that this standard has several narrow exceptions of types of speech that schools can
suppress, the first being '''lewd,' 'vulgar,' 'indecent,' and 'plainly offensive' speech in
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school." 191

The second exception grants schools the ability to regulate ~·school sponsored

speech." 192 The third exception, highlighted in Morse, is speech that occurs during a schoolsponsored event. 193 The court, however, held that the exceptions to Tinker did not apply, and
that the students' conduct at issue did not cause a

~~substantial

disruption of or material

interference with school activities." 194
This case is extremely important to this C01n1nent' s analysis because it affirms the
principle that the Tinker standard is applicable when analyzing school officials' ability to
regulate off-campus conduct In J.S., the Third Circuit found that the student's creation of a
profile making fun of the school principal did not result in a "substantial disruption," but rather
caused only minor interferences with the functioning of the school. 195 Although this circuit was
not willing to allow the school officials to regulate a student making a profile with disparaging
materials against the school principal, using the smart phone to post com1nents to bully another
student i1nplicates a more sensitive and threatening set of circtunstances.
Since the courts have yet to specifically rule upon the issue of whether a school official
can confiscate and search a student's cell phone based on bullying that transpired off-campus, a
new standard for dealing with this issue must be considered. Off-cmnpus conduct provides an
additional burden on the school's responsibility to prevent bullying. This problem is mnplified
by the ability that students have to use their smart phones to post disparaging videos, wall posts,
text 1nessages, or emails in an effo1i to humiliate another student The current state of the law
does not provide school officials with sufficient guidance on how to regulate students' offcmnpus use of their smart phones for bullying. Yet, the older standards that the Supreme Cotui
191
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established, when taken together, can provide school administrators with an appropriate
framevvork that will take into consideration the technological capacities of smart phones
compounded with the pervasive problen1 of bullying. This nevv standard 1nust allow school
officials to investigate and, when necessary, punish students when they use their s1nart phones
on-campus and off-campus to bully and harass another student. The horrific deaths that have
resulted from bullying should be reason enough for the courts to provide a revamped standard
that will allow school administrators with the necessary authority to prevent these types of
tragedies in the future.
Using the Supreme Court standards in TL. 0. and Tinker, school officials will be able to
sufficiently investigate instances of bullying that transpire in and out of the school confines.
Adding the Tinker standard as a prong to the current TL. 0. standard for school conducted
searches and seizures will allow schools greater flexibility to regulate bullying of students. In
addition to adding this prong to the cunent test, courts should apply the new standard using a
balancing method where no one factor is dispositive. This will grant the school officials the
appropriate authority to regulate bullying and allovv the cou1is to use their discretion in deciding
whether, under the circumstances, a search and seizure of a student's phone to investigate
bullying was reasonable. For exmnple, if a student posts a wall post on his or her Facebook
account-vvhich is viewable by the entire student body-with the intent to bully another student,
then the application of the T.L. 0./Tinker hybrid standard to a school official's search and seizure
of the students smart phone will weigh (1) the justification of the search, (2) the reasonableness
of the scope of the search, and (3) the potential that the use of the smart phone will result in a
material or substa11tial interference with the workings of the school. If the cou1i finds that the
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bullying remark on Facebook via the smart phone would cause a substantial disruption in the
school then the scope of the search will be expanded to prevent such interference.
The advanced technology of the cell phone that allows for the mass storage of private
information provides students accused of bullying vvith a strong argument that their privacy
interests 1nay outweigh a school's interest in its investigation. The standard for searching a cell
phone, or s1nart phone, by a school official investigating bullying needs to be revamped to the
standard previously suggested in order to ( 1) allow school ad1ninistrations the ability to uphold
their respective state's anti-bullying statute; and (2) to close the door to this potential loop-hole
that a bullying student can argue to avoid full investigation of his or her cell phone. By adding

Tinker to the cunent standard, and giving this prong substantial weight, schools will be able to
justify their searches and seizures based on the fact that bullying, in most cases, results in a
"substantial disruption" of the learning environment in schools.
As anti-bullying statutes across the country continue to add stricter provisions to their
current laws, school officials are being held to an extremely high standard to detect and
investigate instances of bullying. Under the current state of the law it is unclear whether a school
district would be liable for searching a student's cell phone in an investigation of bullying. 196
Since schools are also held responsible for not detecting and reporting cases of bullying 197 this
puts school administrators in a predicament. The cou1is in the near future have to provide school
officials with more guidance to allow them the appropriate authority to meet their important
responsibilities mandated by their respective state's anti-bullying statute. Continuing the trend
established in recent case law that favors granting school officials more leeway in governing the
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safety of its students, establishing this hybrid standard will allo·w public schools to effectively
regulate bullying that occurs on and off school grounds.
VII. Conclusion
Courts need to expand the T.L. 0. standard to allow school administrators to lawfully
search students' cell phones when the in- and out-of-school use of the device transpires in the
bullying of another student. Since the continued advancement of the s1nart phone allows for the
potential of bullies to evade a search by their school officials, the law needs to intervene to
eliminate this potential loop-hole. State legislatures across the country have taken action in an
effo1i to prevent the negative impact that bullying has on our students. The time is coming
where the courts will also have to take action to assist school administrators in their pursuit of
regulating and preventing bullying on and off school grounds. Adding the Tinker test to the

T.L. 0. standard for

~~reasonable"

searches and seizures in the school setting, will allow school

officials the ability to (1) 1naintain their responsibilities to the anti-bullying statutes provided by
their respective states; (2) maintain their crucial obligations of sustaining a safe learning
enviromnent for their students; and (3) prevent future tragedies such as the examples provided
previously in this Comment.
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